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 The paradox of the two coins with the same side 
The essay on which you are to embark is not an ordinary research paper [ whatever that is]. 
Writing this essay is intended as an exercise in experience- and introspection-based process, 
coming to terms with [or making sense of!] disparities between different mentalities or world 
views, shaped by disparate functional experiences and backgrounds of the authors. It is 
deliberately transgressing, even to the extent of neglecting, disciplinary and experiential 
boundaries, and with a calculated eclectic twinge. It mixes explicit and implicit arguments and 
world views, from cultural studies, from economic perspectives, spinning on philosophical and 
psychological research and analysis. It is a report of some results of a dialogue-based learning 
process. Most of us would probably agree that such learning is by far the most rewarding  and 
even important  learning process. At least this applies to learning focussed on understanding 
what each of us are doing, why we are doing it, how we should be doing it [which of course 
includes the institutional framework of our activities], and how to make sense of what we are 
doing to ourselves and to others  or shorter gaining understanding of the social universe in which 
each of us are participating. 
This paper had a long gestation period. Its roots lie more than ten years back, when the two 
authors started a rewarding dialogue on analysis of the cognitive, cultural and political dimensions 
of S&T policy making. At that time, the two of us collaborated in the Department for Science 
Policy in the Norwegian Ministry for Education and Science on designing and writing a 
Government White Paper on Science and Technology Policy1. This White Paper and the process 
leading up to it introduced interactive, or systemic, innovation as a policy concept into the 
national science and innovation policy debate. The dialogue has been going on since then  with 
this essay as one outcome  and will go on in the future. 
One of the authors, with academic training in philosophy and the history of ideas, remained within 
the policy system, developing and disseminating these ideas into policy design and 
implementation. In this he gained valuable experience in and insights into high level policy 
making in the area of S, T&I [Science, Technology and Innovation] policies, before he switched 
to research and policy analysis two years ago. The other (JH), with academic background from 
theoretical physics and several years as business manager and later as S&T policy maker, returned 
to research. This time it was within the field of economics of innovation and technical change, 
growing out of his need of gaining a better understanding of the analytical basis of innovation 
strategy and policy formation. Here he honed his understanding of the limitations and implications 
of the systemic argument for understanding innovation and economic change and the implied 
basis for innovation policy making. 
In the ongoing collaboration and dialogue over the years, during the last two years again as 
colleagues, the authors have often pondered the following paradox.  
Over the intervening period, policy makers in the area of industrial innovation policies and wider 
economic policies stating that policy priorities and the tools for their implementation must be 
solidly grounded in socio-economic research on innovation capabilities and performance has 
become a highly entrenched comme il faut. More particular; with the emergence of systemic 
arguments of explaining innovation performance and firm-level formation of innovation 
capabilities2, it quickly was seen as needed to argue for the need of an interactive, systemic or 
non-linear approach to understanding innovation  i.e. changes in firms techno-economic 
                                                 
1 The White Paper was published in 1993 as Stortingsmelding nr. 36 (1992-93) Forskning for fellesskapet [Research 
for the Community] 
2 At least for small countries, the OECD Technology/Economy Programme was important during 1989-92 as a forum 
for focussing the policy systems understanding and perceived demand of innovation research based on a system 
perspective. 
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behaviour. As an immediate consequence, development of innovation policy objectives and 
instruments should be rationally based on systemic analysis and research on innovation. In short, 
a story was told of the inappropriateness of a linear view of industrial innovation and the need to 
replace it by an interactive view of the same.  
The lesson being; science does not tell innovation what it will be, innovation and science and 
knowledge generation have to collaborate to create a opportunities for new modes of economic 
behaviour. Irrespective of the  dubious  reality of the claim that the linear model dominated 
science and technology policies in the post war period  innovation is thus seen as not being 
science-based or constituted by scientific and other (formalised) knowledges. This has now 
become so established a view with policy makers and policy analysts that its characterisation as 
common sense within the relevant social context is highly appropriate.  
The recognition behind it is simple  innovation and knowledge generation in a certain sense are 
two cognitive universes; distinct but complementary  and hence, successful interaction between 
the two require mutual understanding and balanced dialogue. Innovation is a techno-economic 
process, involving both domains, requiring specialised insights into both and willingness to 
communicate and understand and communication competences. All three competences; 
technological3, economical, and communication and integration, are necessary, neither are 
sufficient. Now it should be readily seen that this [with the evident translation of key terms] 
applies equally well to the interaction of science, socio-economic or otherwise, and 
entrepreneurial policy making. Just as there are merit/effect-based norms for the art of doing 
business and the art of doing science, there are norms for the art of doing policy (making). In 
all these and other areas performance are aided by but not explained by knowledge sourcing and 
generation. All are highly competence and capability demanding activities  i.e. requiring 
specialised skills and competences, utilising and transforming general knowledge, being highly 
specific to the environment of the activities they support.  
Hence the same requirements for techno-economic innovation should apply to policy (making) 
innovation. The paradox both of us have noted is simply this. In the interaction between 
researchers and policy makers where the needs of a systemic approach on the subject matter is 
not just agreed without debate; in fact it constitutes the rationale for the interaction. However, 
there is also another tacit understanding underpinning the interaction. The request from policy 
makers and the suggestions from researchers and analysts  or put differently, the implicit 
division of responsibilities  implies that the analysts qua scientific experts should deliver 
operative recommendations to policy decision makers. The interaction should address politically 
relevant issues and priorities on a scientific basis, in absence of complementary insights of either 
party into the other side of the equation. The implication of this is the noted paradox; while 
recognising the need of interaction  and hence co-production of relevant competences and 
mediation of knowledge and information from external repositories to specific techno-economic 
behavioural capabilities  concerning economic innovation, the immediate implications for the 
process at hand is not drawn. 
The authors direct concern is with science-policy interaction in the area in which we have been 
operating for many years. However, we strongly believe that the ideas underpinning this essay 
have validity more generally for science-policy interaction. We argue for the need of rethinking 
the interaction between social science and socio-economic policy analysis on the one hand and 
policy making and implementation on the other. The interaction, traditionally conceived as a 
variant of expert-client interaction should rather be conceived in terms of an expert-expert 
                                                 
3 Note we use the term technological in the customary [very] wide, and often misleading, sense  applying equally to 
relations to social as to natural science-based analysis  of operational or functional knowledge and competences. 
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dialogue, with a concomitant requisite generation of a shared framework of communication  
concerning language, concepts, world view or what de denote mentalities, and so on. 
The inevitable conclusion is that any understanding of the impact of (social) scientific research on 
policy must understand the cultural context of the interaction. A suggested avenue to incorporate 
the effects of scientific advice on policy making is seeing such analysis as part of the policy 
systems or policy makers innovation system. We describe the innovating firm as living in a 
structured techno-economic environment, conventionally denoted an innovation system. Equally, 
we should think of a policy organisation, agency etc. as living in a structured environment of 
organisations and institutions, skills and competences, incentives and disincentives. Just as with 
firms innovations, policy development must be seen as driven by human agents perceptions of 
their environment. The perceived environment  - the mental model of the environment  is what 
shapes behavioural changes and adaptations, not the environment as it is. These views have 
immediate consequences for how we think about and organise the science-policy interface. 
The systemic approach 
The systemic approach is grounded in modern innovation theory, a view of economic activity that 
sees innovation as a result of interaction and competence flows in the innovation system.4 The 
innovation system consists of companies, public organisations, R&D institutions and others. The 
ability to innovate is considered a function of the ability to build competences, while the ability to 
develop relevant competences is seen as a result of the companies' ability to take actively part in 
the innovation system. They must connect to the system in order to gain access to the knowledge 
and technology present in this network.   
Firms cannot passively start using new technologies just by reading about them. Although 
companies may gain access to manuals or machinery, the ability to use this knowledge rests on 
the ability to understand, use and integrate this technology into its own learning and innovation 
processes. This ability depends on the employees' education, work experience, organisational, 
social and technological expertise as well as their ability to fetch relevant competences from firms 
and institutions outside the company.  
If firms for some reason fail in finding, absorbing and utilising relevant competences, their ability 
to innovate is weakened. If this is a problem common for many firms in a given industry, region 
or network of related firms (clusters), we are facing a so-called systemic failure, where the flow of 
knowledge and technologies in the system is blocked or hindered in a significant way.  
There can be no such thing as an optimal or perfect flow of competences in social structures like 
these. In the real world it will always be possible to develop new networks or to improve the 
existing ones. Moreover, the system constantly generates new competences that can be combined 
in new and innovative ways to create new forms of behaviour and  as a result of this  new 
products, processes and services. This alone makes a state of a perfect flow of information 
impossible. 
Ultimately it is the firm that must decide when it has developed learning practices that will make 
it able to absorb new knowledge and new technologies in a sufficiently efficient way. In order to 
make this decision, however, it must have a relatively clear view of the competences available in 
the innovation system. Given the large amount of knowledge and expertise present in any part of 
society, this is not an easy task.  Hence, the company not only needs help in order to develop its 
own competences, for instance by co-operating with a research institution. It normally also needs 
assistance in order to map the sources of competence that can potentially be used in the 
development of the firm, i.e. it needs pathfinders as well as co-workers and teachers. 
                                                 
4 Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi et. al. 1988, OECD 1991, 1992, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1992, Metcalfe 1996, Edquist 
1998 
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Innovation services 
In order to improve the functioning of the whole system, one might argue that there is a need for 
expertise that can develop vectors that can help strengthening the firms' ability to learn and 
collaborate with other firms and institutions. From the company perspective these vectors  which 
can include various R&D programmes and institutions, advisory boards, consultancies, 
technology attachés, financial measures and more  can be viewed as innovation services, i.e. 
units that serve companies the competences needed to succeed and that help them find relevant 
sources of competences. They are helpers, assistants, facilitators and partners.5 
The relationship between a company and its service provider will not be based on a passive 
reception of knowledge and technologies. Very often competence building is a result of a form for 
co-operation and collaboration where both firms are experts in their own field.  Hence they both 
learn from this competence building innovation process.  Moreover, a firm that provide 
innovation services to one company may in its own right ask for competences from another  i.e. 
it will be a service provider in one arena and a competence seeker in another. These relationships 
reflect the systemic nature of competence building and innovation. 
It can be argued that the market will and should provide the innovation services needed for 
company competence building and innovation, and  indeed  the data shows that there has grown 
up a rather large sector of so-called knowledge intensive business services (KIBS)  i.e. various 
forms of private consultancies that together with the research institutions provide technology and 
advice. Hence there should be no need for government intervention in this arena.  
Others, however, argue that especially small and medium sized companies lack the competences 
needed to find, develop and make us of contacts in the innovation system.  They are in effect 
unable to find the competences needed to succeed in the market. These policy makers argue that it 
might be in the public interest to help these companies.  The companies may, for instance, 
contribute to much needed economic growth or employment or their competences and 
technologies may give important input to the development of other sectors of society.  If this is the 
case, one can argue that someone should implement, encourage and support policy vectors that 
can help these companies learn where to find competence sources and how to interact with them.  
The public role 
Firms seldom have the ability to consider the welfare of the whole innovation system. The 
individual company is mainly responsible for its own survival and success. Their managers 
neither have the resources or the competences needed to improve the overall flow of competences 
in a particular industrial cluster or the national innovation system as a whole. 
If the individual companies cannot be expected to take responsibility for the gardening of the 
whole system, then who can? In some fields large multinational companies can do their part in 
developing a certain sector. Then there are the industrial associations, which attempt to improve 
the working conditions of their members. The fact remains, however, that the only institutions that 
have the resources needed to look after the whole system, is the national governments, or  on the 
European level  the European Union.  
Policy development and learning 
Although several European governments have developed policy vectors aimed at improving the 
competence flows in the system, this is a task that goes beyond the normal market failure rationale 
                                                 
5 It should be stressed, however, that although these policy vectors, measures and institutions may function as services 
vis-à-vis the companies, this is not necessarily their only purpose. An R&D institution will often have public tasks 
that go beyond the needs of industry.  
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used to legitimise public intervention in the field of innovation and technology development.6 In 
order to develop and gain support for new measures in this field, policy makers need a coherent 
argumentation that can be used to develop and explain such policy vectors. 
Unfortunately there have not been many relevant studies of learning in policy-making institutions 
or the political system. Hence it is hard to fine-tune a set of tools that can be used in order to 
develop the policy system's competences in the field of innovation systems theory and innovation 
services. However, we have done preliminary studies of competence building in ministries, 
directorates, research councils and other relevant institutions in order to gain insight into the 
learning processes that take place there. 
Interviews and workshop style interactions with policy makers reveal a complex system of policy 
making and development institutions, defying simple explanations of policy formulation. The 
policy makers operate within a diverse organisational culture, where he or she has to take a wide 
range of factors into consideration. This include the ideology of the present political leadership, 
the present political situation, the role of the media and public opinion, the ruling mentality 
within the ministry, organisation or unit, power struggles and established divisions of 
responsibility between ministries and agencies, the need for financing and so forth.   
Scientific research and research based analysis are only one set among many of inputs into these 
processes, and generally not a very important one. The policy maker  driven by considerations of 
relevance within his or her activity world, not of universality, organised scepticism7 or intra-
disciplinary relevance  will generally see the commissioning, interpreting and using science and 
related analysis in the relevance context, the socio-technical system in which she plays a part. 
As  contributions to the complex competence and capability bases underpinning the activity of 
policy making, science and scientific knowledge is more or less irrelevant. What is relevant, are 
the highly specific and even idiosyncratic relevant competences and capabilities these knowledges 
are transformed and amalgamated into. Most of the large number of policy makers we continually 
interact with, express a need for policy-oriented research, i.e. research that may be easily used in 
policy development. Many criticise innovation research for being too theoretical and academic, 
and not targeted towards the practical problems facing the policy agencies. Some ask for concrete 
policy advice, while others would like the researcher to map various alternatives as regards 
policies and policy vectors and to analyse the possible consequences following various lines of 
action. Generally there is a depreciation of the costly requirement of establishing a 
communication enabling meeting ground  of the development of mutual understanding of the 
other partys context. 
There is definitely a need for improved forms of communication between policy makers and 
researchers. This should allow researchers better to understand the competence needs and 
requirements of policy makers and systems, and to give the policy maker an improved 
understanding of potentials and limitations of such research and transformational capabilities to 
utilise the general tools and conceptual frameworks the scientist provide. From a competence 
perspective, reading a scientific report or paper is highly unlikely to be an efficient form of policy 
learning8. In order to take full account of implications of socio-economic research and analysis, 
the policy maker needs to internalise an understanding of the research, within the relevance 
norms, world views and other structures of her world. We have all learned the hard way that 
cross-world interaction requires time, energy and costs. The interaction of scientific experts with 
                                                 
6 For a general introduction to innovation policies based on systemic approaches, see the forthcoming OECD reports 
on the national innovation systems (OECD 2000). 
7 or any other of the Mertonian CUDOS-norms or similar norm systems. 
8 Concerning the main mode of relaying research and analysis to the policy system, we presume we are not the only 
ones having heard complaints of dust collectors, timing failure of delivery etc. 
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policy experts demands the creation of a common ground, where interactive learning  or co-
production of capabilities  is generated. It is important to recognise also that the transformation 
and communication process is a process of sorting  of sorting information according to different 
modes of contextually determined relevance  of reducing information redundancy. A uni-
dimensional transmission of science into policy simply does not do the trick. 
Hence there is a need for improved fora and forms of interaction and transmission  of moulding 
science into policy, laying the ground for more effective policy learning processes. This benefit 
the researcher as well, he has to understand the lifeworld and context of the policy maker. 
The following text is a (fictional) memo to an unnamed minister of innovation policy, explaining 
the basis of a recent research programme in which we were involved and discussing the need for a 
research, innovation and technology services policy. The situation is set in a realistic context of 
government priority setting where such questions are most likely to appear. Thus the messages of 
the communication with the ministerial level is many-dimensional and reflecting implicit shared 
and hidden agendas, as well as intendedly open communication of science. Hence, you will find 
distorted, and even what a scientific expert would characterise as wrong or out-dated, 
descriptions of scientific results. Neither the possibility that these are consequences of 
ignorance, nor that they play intended roles in the memo, should be excluded. 
  Policy Memorandum 
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Policy Memorandum 
Ministry of Innovation 
Directorate of Innovation Services 
Director General (sign)/27 Jun 2002 
 
MEMO 
The Annual Cabinet Budget Conference: On the role of innovation services in the 
innovation system 
 
 To the Minister, 
  
 We refer to Cabinet meeting document No. 2002-27, containing the 
Ministry of Finances budget proposals in the area of knowledge 
production and dissemination. This Memo contains arguments that might 
be used in the Cabinet discussions. 
  
 Proposals of the Ministry of Finance 
Budget cuts 
proposed by 
the Ministry of 
Finance 
As expected the Ministry of Finance is proposing substantial cuts in the 
public funding of R&D and innovation support, arguing that the economy 
is overheating and that there is a need to curb public spending. The 
Minister of Finance maintains that a further increase in the inflation rate 
will harm the competitiveness of our industries, which in the long run may 
lead to higher unemployment and social unrest.  
The Minister also claims that the beneficial effects of the Governments 
innovation policies have not been documented, and that competence 
building and knowledge acquisition and dissemination for competitiveness 
is a task for industry itself. 
  
 The Department of Innovation Services has reason to believe that the 
Ministry of Finance assumes that a further increase in public spending on 
health, pensions and social services is unavoidable of political reasons. The 
Minister of Finance will therefore fight hard to reduce expenses in other 
parts of the budget. 
  
 The Department suggests that the Minister co-operate with the Minister of 
Education and Science on the topic of funding of basic university and 
college science (see separate Memo on the overall Government R&D 
budget).   
  
 This Memo will concentrate on the issue of producing, distributing 
and upgrading competences in the innovation system.  
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 Market Failure 
 The Minister of Finance will accept that there is a need for public support 
for research and development.  She will do so on the basis of the 
traditional market failure rationale. The argument goes like this:  
  
The Market 
failure 
argument 
R&D that leads to new or improved products, processes or services will 
not only benefit the company that perform or finance this activity.  The 
companies and people that use this new product will also profit from 
increased efficiency. A new drug will not only benefit the pharmaceutical 
company, it may benefit the whole society.  
According to the market failure argument, firms are prone to invest too 
little in R&D, as they are unable to harvest the profits following from this 
spin off effect. This is a problem if the competitors benefit as much from 
the innovation as themselves. Moreover, R&D is always a risky adventure, 
which may stop some firms from investing. 
  
 Although this department is sceptical towards some of the premises behind 
the concept of market failure (especially the idea that the chaotic nature of 
everyday business is but a deviation from perfect or  balanced market 
conditions), there is no need to argue against it. It is certainly true that 
society at large may benefit much more from an innovation than the 
company doing or financing the research. This is a strong argument for 
public support for R&D. 
 The systemic view of innovation 
 Traditionally economists have tended to view innovation  i.e. the 
learning-based process of developing new, and improving existent, 
products, processes and services  as something that is introduced into the 
economy from the outside (externality).  Although most  if not all  
economists now agree that technological development is a major 
contributor to economic growth, innovation policies are normally not 
considered a part of economic and financial policies.  
  
 Modern innovation theory argues that:9 
  
Innovation is 
an integrated 
part of the 
economy 
! Technological change cannot be seen as something delivered from the 
outside into the economy.  Innovation is rather seen as an integrated 
part of economic development. Managers, workers, engineers and 
researchers all take part in a process aimed at producing and 
developing products that someone asks for or might need in the future. 
The most successful firms are most likely those that manage to advance 
new or improved commodities or services. 
                                                 
9 We refer the Minister to the summary and implications of the document Innovation policy in a knowledge-based 
economy, European Commission, Luxembourg 2000, discussed at the Board of DGs meeting 15 May. 
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Companies 
take part in 
clusters 
! No company is an island in itself. All firms take part in complex 
networks of suppliers, customers, partners, consultants and research 
institutions, as well as various forms of public governance and 
regulations.  
 
Studies show that companies are more likely to interact with some 
companies and institutions than others, i.e. with those they share a 
common interest. It turns out that most companies have the closest 
relationships with customers and suppliers within the same branch of 
industry or the same field of trade.  
 
If you map the flow of trade, people and knowledge between 
companies, you will find clusters of companies that are strongly inter-
connected, often being suppliers and buyers in the same chain of 
production. These companies frequently interact with the same parts of 
the public apparatus, including research institutions, offices and 
programmes that are established to help these companies with advice, 
information, facilitation and money. You will also find privately owned 
consultancies (often termed knowledge-intensive business services  or 
KIBS) that aim at supporting these firms in their innovation effort. 
 
These groups of firms and institutions may be anchored regionally or 
locally, in which case we talk of regional or local clusters. However, 
these patterns of interaction might also cross regional or national 
borders, forming national or international clusters. 
 
Industrial 
success rests 
on an efficient 
flow of 
competences 
! It follows from this that the economic success of an industry to a large 
extent rests on the distributions and flows of competence-building 
resources in the relevant clusters, i.e. on whether the individual 
companies are able to get hold of, understand and use the resources 
available in the cluster. These resources may be found in various 
institutions, and includes formalised, research-based knowledge. 
 
In a similar vein one could argue that in the long term the main key to 
the economic health of a nation is found in the production and 
reproduction of relevant competences and knowledge in the innovation 
system, not primarily in interest rates, inflation rates or a balanced 
budget. 
 
A recent major European research project, the COIN project, indicates 
that as long as clusters have built in mechanisms to renew and re-invent 
themselves their competences and experience are very precious assets, 
regardless of their R&D-intensity (i.e. whether they are classified as 
high-tech or low-tech). However, most successful clusters are the 
results of long and complex social processes. To artificially create new 
cluster may be a too costly strategy from both a policy and industry 
point of view.  It is much easier and cost-effective to build on existing 
strengths.  
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• When developing their competences and innovative capability firms 
may interact with various forms of competence providers, including 
other firms, public institutions, universities and colleges. From the 
firms point of view these all provide competence services.   
 
Some companies and institutions specialize in providing research, 
innovation and technology services for firms. These have traditionally 
been called RTOs (Public or semi-public Research and technology 
organisations  including public laboratories and research institutes as 
TENTECH and MoDs MILSON) and KIBS providers (Knowledge 
intensive business services  predominantly private consultancies, or 
market-based).  
 
The EC COIN study shows that in quite a number of clusters RTOs and 
increasingly KIBS provide all sorts of knowledge-related service 
functions that help actors in these clusters to innovate and to adapt. The 
mix of service functions and the balance between what services are 
provided by RTOs vs. KIBS vary from cluster to cluster. However, the 
general trend is that RTOs tend to move more downstream providing 
more hands on and implementation like services, whereas KIBS 
increasingly perform services that used to be associated with RTOs and 
institutions of higher education only. 
   
 Competence and learning 
Innovation 
depends on 
the ability to 
learn 
Modern innovation theory argues that the companies ability to innovate 
rests on their ability to learn. By this is meant not only learning through 
trial and error within the companies own walls, but by learning from 
others in the relevant system of innovation.  
 
Learning is not passive absorption of information.  Information is in itself 
worth nothing unless you know where to find it, and how to mobilise it in a 
relevant context  hence the need for close interaction with other people 
and institutions.  
 
In order to learn and stay up to date the companies and their employees 
must stay in touch with related companies, institutions, and other sources 
of knowledge and competence building (including everything from 
research laboratories to trade fairs, conferences and professional 
associations). 
Knowledge is 
not a free or  
common good 
The Minister of Finance may argue that knowledge is a common good  
freely available to anyone who knows how to read. In practice, however, it 
is not. In firms knowledge is but an aspect of competence, meaning the 
ability to perform significant tasks and to solve problems that enable firms 
to compete effectively and sustainably in markets. Abstract theoretical 
knowledge is of small value unless it is utilised in innovation practice. 
Another company cannot just download a competitor's organisation or 
work and life experience from the Internet.   
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 This is why companies invest in R&D in spite of the market failure, and 
this is why companies adopt innovative practices and organisational 
structures. For a period of time they will have competitive advantage based 
on improved competence that may be hard to imitate, even if they are 
unable to patent the innovation.  
  
Tacit 
knowledge 
Knowledge includes so-called tacit knowledge, including the contacts of 
individuals, intuition and creativity, social intelligence, background 
knowledge, a sense of context and appropriateness, and more.  
  
Culture and 
social skills 
At the collective level, knowing what to do in a firm involves company 
and business culture, shared genres of practice, and the local languages 
and stories that are part of the furniture of a workplace. Competences  a 
firm's abilities to do significant things in markets  include such tacit as 
well as explicit and formal elements.  
  
Machinery Competences also include the material apparatus of the firm  concrete 
configurations of capital assets such as machinery or computers, materials, 
documents, the communications infrastructure, the physical and practical 
organisation of space, etc. In practice, the competences of a company take 
the form of the entire organisation of resources available to actors in the 
firm. 
  
Tradeable 
assets 
Consequently learning is related to the acquisition of assets, including 
tradable knowledge assets, the public goods of basic science and hard 
technology and machinery. But tradable assets and public goods are not, in 
themselves, competences. Further investment is required to configure  
them into significant competences  to make them useful.   
  
 Whether a firm succeeds in developing the much-needed competences, 
depends to a large degree on its ability to build linkages to relevant firms, 
organisations and innovation services.  Although a firm can be said to 
belong to a certain industrial cluster (which is a theoretical concept), that 
does not necessarily mean it is good at networking. 
 Institutional failure 
 The Minister of Finance would like to cut the budget of several 
programmes targeting competence building in firms and knowledge 
dissemination, claiming that this is the responsibility of industry. She 
claims that the publics responsibility should be limited to funding 
university and college science.  
  
Lack of 
networking 
and the ability 
to find, 
understand 
and use new 
However, recent research from the EU research project COIN and others 
confirm the need for a pro-active and extensive Government policy of such 
programmes. A lot of companies lack the competences needed to make use 
of university science in specific competitive settings. The staff may not 
have the education that is needed, they may lack the necessary contacts in 
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knowledge the university sector or they may lack the experience of transforming 
academic knowledge into industrial competences.  
As it happens, most innovation is done without direct use of university 
research.10 For most companies it is more important to build learning 
relationships with other firms, suppliers as well as customers. 
  
 Moreover, they may also lack the experience to evaluate how relationships 
with external sources of knowledge, skill, assets and insights might 
contribute in a practical way to new, improved, relevant competences.   
  
Systemic 
failure: Plugs 
in the 
knowledge 
flows 
Companies thus often face what researchers have called systemic failure, 
i.e. they are unable to mobilise resources needed to perform certain 
innovation activities. They cannot get access to a relevant competence 
(from an external specialist) or the means of building a relevant 
competence within the firm. One could say that flows of knowledge and 
other competence resources in the innovation system are restricted in such 
a way that it hinders much needed innovation.  This is especially true for 
small and medium-sized firms that often lack the personnel and 
competences needed to access the relevant networks and institutions.  
  
 Issues of perception are involved, together with interpretation (making 
sense of unfamiliar arrangements), communication, practical abilities to 
get certain things done, finding the right institutions etc., which make them 
invisible to potential beneficiaries.  
In a sense these are all market failures. A perfect market would have 
none of these problems because all information would be perfectly 
meaningful and all resources perfectly available. But in real-time and real 
space, real humans and real firms have these problems of institutional 
failure. Hard institutional failures are in formal organisations (e.g. 
universities, government departments, firms), soft failures are in culture: 
good practice, norms, language, expectations, stereotypes, etc. 
  
 Some policy makers argue that the impressive growth of the KIBS market, 
shows that the private technology services do meet the demand of industry 
and that there for this reason is no need for public measures. However, the 
COIN programme has documented that research, innovation and 
technology services may be marginal in particular clusters of innovating 
firms, while simultaneously being viable as revenue-generating companies.  
In other words, the market in innovation services does not guarantee that 
the companies that need them most get acccess to these services. Hence as 
society we do not reap sufficiently the potential benefits from these 
                                                 
10 Meaning that they are not using results from basic research directly and that they are not in contact with universities 
and other institutions doing basic research.  However, they use knowledge and technologies, which have components 
that have been developed through basic research, and personnel trained in universities. For instance: All companies 
use computers, and although modern computers are not developed in science labs, they contain materials developed 
through basic science and software based on logical systems developed in universities. 
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developments. The Minister may argue that the Government has an 
important task in ensuring that these welfare effect are reaped, to the 
benefit of our society. 
 Systemic policy measures 
Public support 
to the 
development 
of a network 
of innovation 
services 
This is why the Ministry of Innovation has decided to support the 
development of an extensive policy initiative towards the provision and use 
of so-called innovation services. These are services provided by several 
firms, institutions, organisations or programmes, helping firms get access 
to much needed competences in these external organisations, or to factors 
that enable them to build and upgrade sustainable competences in-house, 
as well as exploiting the existing assets, resources and competences of the 
firm. 
  
 The Ministry of Finance will probably argue that the public contribution to 
innovation services should be the responsibility of public universities, 
colleges, R&D institutes and laboratories only. These do indeed play 
important roles as service providers in this.  
  
 However, the Minister could argue that institutions like the universities 
and colleges have tasks that go far beyond the needs of industry.  Their 
role of providers of basic, long-term science often demands a culture that is 
not always compatible with the short-term horizon of small and medium-
sized businesses.  A too strong focus on industry needs may undermine the 
long-term aspect of university research. Furthermore, what the firms need 
is often not new basic science, but more practical technological or 
organisational solutions based on already existing knowledge. 
  
RTOs and 
KIBS 
The main business oriented competence services today are the research and 
technology organisations (RTOs, mainly industry-oriented, public-funded 
technology institutes or research laboratories) and knowledge intensive 
business services firms (including various forms of private consultants and 
professional services firms). Under pressure of reduced public funding 
many RTOs increasingly operate as KIBS, perhaps on a private non-profit 
basis.  
The recent COIN study shows that RTOs are so diverse in their 
institutional form and service activities that it is impossible to give a clear 
definition, and misleading even to offer a typology.  From an innovation 
policy and functional point of view it is probably better to talk about 
research institutes, laboratories, consultancies as innovation services. To 
these services one should also add units performing routine operations 
associated with the productive use of technological apparatus  for 
example, testing and certification, maintenance, health and safety audits  
and providers of machinery and new technology.  These may not all be 
targeting innovation directly, but by improving the competences of the 
firm they strengthen the firms ability to innovate. 
It should be added that from an institutional and administrative point of 
view, it may still make sense to speak about R&D institutes and labs (as 
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TENTECH), RTOs, KIBS etc. 
  
 Some innovation services do an excellent job connecting firms with firms, 
firms with R&D institutions, and firms with relevant public measures, but 
the effect of their work varies from region to region, industry to industry. 
This variation is partly due to individual, cultural and historical differences 
in the institutions, but mainly due to the differing dynamics and 
requirements of the clusters that the RTOs and KIBS serve.  
Of course, innovation systems and clusters are dynamic, i.e. they evolve 
over time, and the relevance or effectiveness of public-funded RTOs, for 
example, may change (especially if RTOs or universities themselves do not 
change). 
  
The 
innovation 
system is 
varied and 
constantly 
changing, 
hence the 
need for 
dynamic 
innovation 
policies 
This variation means that one cannot base innovation policy on a 
theoretical basis that treats all firms, industries, regions and innovation 
services in the same way. This is why the Ministry of Finance is mistaken 
when they claim that there is no need for public measures in this field. The 
individual business owner cannot  and probably should not  concern 
herself with the overall functioning of the innovation system. It is her job 
to develop a successful firm where she is.  The same applies to managers 
of RTOs; they have a difficult job maintaining the excellence of their 
services, balancing the budget and identifying appropriate, competent 
clients for their services. 
  
The public 
institutions 
have the 
overall 
responsibility 
for developing 
the innovation 
system 
On the other hand, the public policy makers, the industrial corporations 
and relevant researchers must have an overall view of the national and 
regional innovation systems, including the public and private innovation 
services provided within them.  
Public policy must contribute to the development of a comprehensive 
system of knowledge institutions and innovation programmes that can 
improve the flow and distribution of relevant competences and competence 
factors in various industries and clusters. Neglecting this implies the 
neglect of prospective long term welfare gains for society at large, in 
breach with the main policy objectives set out in Minister of Finances 
White Paper to Parliament on long term economic policy objectives, WP 
23/2001 Prosperity for All. 
Private KIBS will always play an important role as competence suppliers 
for firms, but they are not able to fulfil the needs of the whole system. 
There are definite needs for publicly organised and funded policy vectors 
at these firms and sectors and their interaction with their clients. 
  
 The COIN programme identify several core elements for policy related to 
innovation services: 
• Build firms competences to use external innovation services (In most 
advanced countries, articulating demand is more important than 
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increasing the supply of innovation services). 
• Facilitate a sound division of labour between various kinds of suppliers 
and different kinds of service content. 
• Match services to cluster requirements in strategically important cluster 
(high-tech as well as low tech, new as well as traditional industries). 
• Integrate actions across policy areas and government functions. 
• Assess the contribution of innovation services in specific clusters, and 
give priority to existing clusters when developing public-funded or 
sponsored vectors/measures. 
• The various institutions contain mixes of economic and social tasks or 
functions, which vary from cluster to cluster and from country to 
country.  When developing policies it is important to identify the actual 
innovation functions of these units. 
• Safeguard multiple roles of innovation service providers (RTOs and 
KIBS) under other aspects of policy (including employment, labour 
relations, the environment, health, public welfare, culture and social 
affairs). 
  
 The Innovation White Paper 
Change and 
Opportunity 
The Minister could remind the Cabinet of the recent proposals forwarded 
in the White Paper on Innovation Policy Change and Opportunity  on 
Industrial Innovation and Creativity. This clearly states that the 
Government wants to go beyond the traditional science and technology 
policy, where the State focuses on supporting R&D institutions only. The 
paper states that: 
  
To establish a 
structure of 
competence 
institutions 
• It is the goal of the Government to establish a well functioning 
institutional structure of R&D institutions, knowledge-intensive 
business services, public measures for high risk financial support, 
and programmes aimed at improving the competences of firms to 
learn. (p. 17) 
 
Dynamic 
capabilities of 
firms 
•   One should increase the dynamic capability of firms, thus 
strengthening their absorptive capacity and generating and updating 
their strategic technological competences. (p. 18) 
 
Uphold 
modern 
education 
• It is the goal of the Government to uphold a modern, adaptive 
sector of education of high quality that may bring out skilled and 
creative people that can fulfil the needs of our society, our culture 
and our economic life. (p. 35) 
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 However, this is not enough. When focusing on the needs of business, the 
paper also focuses on the systemic nature of innovation and knowledge-
creation: 
  
Develop 
public 
innovation 
services for 
interaction 
and co-
operation 
• The Government will continue to develop public services aimed at 
improving the interaction between the participants in the innovation 
system.  These will include publicly funded, chartered or franchised 
innovation services in areas of the economy where there are few or 
no relevant private companies.  Where the opportunity offers, these 
will be 'prototypes' of potentially viable commercial services. (...) 
 
The main effort, however, will be targeted towards programmes 
for co-operation and interaction within and sometimes across 
various industrial clusters: collaborating for competition.  These 
measures will counteract institutional failure of both an 
organisational and a cultural kind within the system, failure that 
prevents resources and competences outside the firm from being 
identified or used in innovation. (...) 
 
Sometimes market failures of a straightforward kind are involved 
and appropriate financial measures (e.g. public venture capital) will 
be integrated with 'institutional failure' measures. (p. 45) 
 
Regulatory 
reform. • The Government will continue to improve structural elements in 
the system, including regulatory frameworks, taxation, technical 
standards, risk-management rules, health and safety regulations. 
(p. 46) 
  
Programme 
aimed at 
strengthening 
the learning 
capacities of 
firms. 
A system 
based on a 
mix of private 
and public 
institutions. 
Programme 
for 
strengthening 
the 
competences 
of policy 
makers. 
The white paper also announces (pp. 54-60): 
! The creation of a new programme aimed at supporting the building of 
systematic competences of firms to evaluate and use external sources 
of knowledge and capability, 
! The development of a service system based on a sound mix of private 
and public institutions, including hybrids based on public as well as 
private finance and participation, 
! A new programme aimed at building in the strategic and administrative 
competences of policy makers involved in innovation policy and the 
design of innovation services. The Government shall identify the actual 
innovation functions performed by public-funded suppliers and R&D 
services in the various industries, clusters and regions, and get a better 
insight into their various roles and tasks.  
Some RTOs have functions going beyond the role of research and 
technology services, including scientific advice to the public, inputs to 
political debate and decision making, inputs to judicial processes, 
operational services to firms and government departments, or  even  
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basic research.  The Government has been criticised for trying to sacrifice 
these long-term public tasks on the altar of short-sighted innovation 
processes in industry. Some of the ministers may repeat these concerns on 
the conference, especially the Minister of Culture and the Minster of 
Health and Social Affairs.   
The Minister can refer to the White Paper's discussion of these matters. It 
states that these functions should not be weakened, as the interaction 
between the various functions will strengthen their long-term ability to 
perform innovation services, as well as their capability of accomplishing 
other tasks. 
  
 Conclusion 
University 
science and 
industry 
There now seem to be broad agreement on the need for strong support to 
our R&D institutions, and especially for university science and 'bridging' 
mechanisms between university R&D and industry such as the Foresight 
programme and various regional networking initiatives.   
  
 Clearly university research has cultural and social goals that go far 
beyond the needs of industry.  From an economical point of view, however, 
the Government has a responsibility for making certain that relevant 
competences and resources developed in these institutions are utilised by 
industry in the most efficient way possible.  
  
Exploiting the 
competences 
of industry 
It is also important to ensure that the competences of our industry are 
exploited effectively, since these constitute a far larger national resource 
base than the whole of the university sector. This can only be done by a 
two-pronged strategy: 
  
Establishing a 
learning 
framework 
• Establishing a framework that improves the companies ability to 
learn, mobilising, generating and using new competences.  
  
Improving 
innovation 
linkages 
• Improving the linkages between firms and between firms and 
institutions (including firms) providing innovation services in the 
form of either ready to use competences for innovation, or various 
factors for competence-building (including data, information, staff, 
physical technology and intangible assets).  
  
An innovative 
industry gives 
a strong 
economy 
Our economy and our welfare rest on an industry that is able to innovate 
and adapt to constantly changing environments. Hence it is in the interest 
of both society and the Ministry of Finance to support measures that 
improve the competitive edge of industry.  
  
Need for 
strong public 
institution for 
In order to develop such instruments and policies, strong public institutions 
and offices with the financial resources necessary to learn the nature of the 
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innovation 
and co-
operation 
various clusters and industries are needed. Innovation services must be 
available and relevant for industrial use.  
  
 The Minister of Innovation must therefore oppose the proposed cuts in the 
research and innovation budgets, and asks that the proposals forwarded in 
the White Paper on Innovation Policy is carried out as set out by the 
Cabinet, and strongly supported by the Parliament majority. 
 
END OF MEMO 
 Innovation services and policy development  
The synthesis report of the OECD TEP programme, Technology in a Changing World11, 
reproduces the policy statement on technology and the economy that was adopted by the OECD 
Council at Ministerial level at the conclusion of the TEP programme in June 1991. In the 
statement OECD Ministers  ...reaffirm the importance of fostering diffusion and wide acceptance 
of technology within their economies and societies, and underscore the critical importance of 
human resource development and mobility for the competitiveness of firms and countries (p. 9). 
Through the TEP programme and the subsequent discussions among policy makers and 
researchers, the systemic approach to innovation policy became the accepted line of arguments 
among policy makers within systems having responsibility for technological research and 
development, industrial development and guidance etc., in most OECD countries. Policy makers 
and politicians in this area today make frequent use of arguments from modern innovation theory, 
based on the view of innovation as the fruit of efficient flows of and generation of information; 
perceptions, competences, knowledge and ideas in a larger network of firms, organisations, public 
institutions and regulations. 
Theory and reality 
However, both with researchers and policy makers, this viewpoint is in no way taken for granted, 
it is quite evident that there is still a need for defending the position  often against strong 
counter-forces.  In an often ritualistic manner policy documents and research papers frequently 
have spent substantial resources on declaring the death of the linear model, evidently seen as 
way of convincing the generally undeclared opponents.  
We all say the linear model is dead, one policy maker told us, but still a lot of policy makers 
[in other agencies or ministries] act as if this is not the case.  Maybe they have not grasped the 
true implications of the new way of thinking, or maybe they still find it opportune [for their other 
purposes!] to use more old fashioned arguments.12 
There are no simple explanations for this phenomenon  whether referring to ignorance, rhetorics 
or otherwise. Firstly, in no country13 do we see a policy apparatus characterised by monolithic 
ideological consensus, detailed objectives and their operative expressions. Rather, there are 
generally large variations in ways of thinking, policy strategies, historical traditions and 
institutional frameworks, conflicting interests or interpretations of shared goals and interests. 
Even within the same ministry, the world-view in one department or directorate may be in direct 
conflict with that of another. This may reflect or be reflected in intense battles of the positions or 
impact, not just between, but even within ministries.  
In research on the economics of innovation attempts, with some progress, have been made to 
develop an evolutionary-based microeconomic theory that generalise or may supplant textbook 
neo-classical microeconomic theory. Including basic aspects of the technological competitive 
framework facing firms, innovation would be integrated into the basic platform and tool box for 
analysing economic phenomena. The confrontational approaches of some of these documents 
towards neo-classical economics are clearly unwarranted, but evidently play a role for internal 
purposes. Although our experiences mainly are within one national (Norwegian) context, 
collaboration and discussions with colleagues in other countries have convinced us that conflicts 
                                                 
11 Technology in a Changing World, OECD Paris 1991. 
12 From an interview with a Norwegian ministerial policy maker June 2000. 
13 At least no country with which we acknowledge comparison. 
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and schisms may be identified, though they may be strongly imprinted by the specificities of 
institutional structure and divisions in each country.  
Research and policy making, another linear model 
There is no one-to-one mapping of socio-economic studies onto policy development. Policy 
development, the evolution  and revolution  of objectives, instruments and other modes of 
implementation etc. is not reducible to explaining an expanding socio-economic knowledge base. 
Surprisingly researchers and policy makers addressing innovation and its systemic characteristics 
as a primary activity, often seem to fall back to a linear understanding of the relation beween 
socio-economic research and analysis and policy development and implementation. Policy makers 
implement objective analysis of researchers into relevant policy measures. 
The daily reality of policy makers is much more complex. Scientific inputs are only one of many 
factors influencing policy development.  Policy makers and politicians must also continually 
balance sectoral objectives against other sectoral objectives and overall policy objectives and 
priorities  far beyond the sphere of innovation and industrial development. Then there is the 
press and public opinion to consider, cultural and ideological differences, as well as the constant 
struggle between the various parts of the political apparatus for funding and power (Edwards 
1999). Policy making is an activity that must be seen as operating on the basis of a complex 
competence base by itself, the operation of which requires a wide range of tacit and hands-on 
skills and capabilities. It is an activity that is definitely knowledge intensive  maybe one of the 
most knowledge intensive activities in our economies  but its incentive and norm structures are 
very different from the rather simple ones operating on the science side. 
These and similar views have strong implications for how we think about the interaction of 
scientists and analysts with policy makers and how we may design the interface between them.  
Mentalities 
Periods with dominating mentalities 
In a recent paper Hauknes and Wicken (2002) outlines some aspects of recent innovation policies 
in Norway and points to some possible trends of these policies for the upcoming years. A main 
concern is to elicit what the underlying presumptions about industrial production and value 
creation is and what the ultimate aim of modern competitive industry was.  
A core assumption in the paper is that industrial innovation policies in any period basically find 
their political aim in the perception of a gap between what is regarded as the 'idealised modern' 
industry and characteristics of the present industries.  This ideal may vary over time, and an 
identification of key ideal models in various phases would thus contribute to explaining shifts in 
policy makers perceptions of challenges to be met or problems to be solved by industrial policies. 
The same applies to shifts in policy objectives and in the measures and instruments developed and 
used to attain these objectives. 
Though there are various other mechanisms that may cause shifts in these policy mentalities, such 
as enhanced scientific understanding of economic growth and development, it seems that the 
contribution of these to explain wider mentality shifts of the public communities generally are 
minor.  The guiding role of these inputs lies probably more in shaping and advising policy 
formulation at the detailed level, within the framework of any governing mentality. 
The core rationale for an industrial policy and its daughter innovation policy is based on the role 
of the industrial enterprise as a generator of welfare. The industrial enterprise, and the economic 
system, is a value creator in these terminologies, generating national income both on the private 
and the public hand, determining the level general (economic) welfare.  
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Thus ultimately industrial policy is a central part of overall welfare policies. As well as pointing 
to why industrial policies have been given strong attention in the period we consider here from 
political parties and the policy system, it also throws light on why the indicated mentalities are 
important; they are ultimately ideals about the best generation of social economic welfare. 
The mentality concept 
The mentalities of policy practice have emerged at specific periods in history, in the form of 
relatively coherent and explicit clusters of policy positions and practical measures.  They may be 
interpreted as genres, paradigms or as ideal models of industry14. 
Mentalities persist, or have inertia.  They continue to operate after the period during which they 
originated and are embedded in institutional structures and arrangements as well as in policy 
practices and instruments. They constitute a framework for policy discourse among policy makers 
and between these and the relevant policy environment. 
Mentalities and ideologies 
Mentalities are often considered self-evident and are not necessarily explicitly formulated by 
policy makers. Researchers and scholars may, however, try to give a clearer description of such 
worldviews, developing what one can call ideologies, i.e. systematically developed models 
based on a given mentality or view of reality.15 Studies of innovation may for instance be linked 
to one or more of the dominating schools of economics, including traditional neo-classical 
economics, new growth theory and evolutionary innovation theories. These may be considered the 
ideologies of innovation research and policy making. 
There is, however, no one to one relationship between these ideologies and the mentalities of 
policy makers. Studies show clearly that any idea of policy development as being solely a product 
of ideologies or practical research is misconceived.  There are no linear processes  neither 
starting in universities or science, nor in false ideologies  leading to new policies in ministries 
and policy institutions. Rather there is a complex and multi-directional interaction between these 
and other factors, continually strengthening and counter-acting each other. History is important, 
reflected in institutional (in the wide sociological sense) structures, in the socially constructed 
reality of the policy system etc. 
This should come as no surprise to people involved in innovation policies and innovation theory, 
given the strong slant towards systemic thinking.  Nevertheless, the fact that there have been few 
studies of policy learning has often led to an oversimplified and distorted understanding of the 
                                                 
14 The term mentality will have to be an ambiguous one, given that a lot of the attitudes and opinions that follow are 
not necessarily the result of systematic reflection. In this respect it has a lot in common with Thomas Kuhns 
paradigm (Kuhn 1970, Masterman 1972), Michel Foucalts mentality and Hans Blumenbergs epochs 
(Blumenberg 1983), although our mentality must be understood as a matrix of ideas that encompass a specific group 
of people, not a whole society or epoch. 
 
One can also interpret the term hermeneutically.  In this case the basis of the lifeworld (i.e. the total life experience 
and competences) of the individual is shaped by ideas, competences and attitudes that are common in his or her 
cultural and social context. Hence policy makers and researchers in a particular environment and period of time will 
have their lifeworlds shaped by the same influences  they will take part in the same mentality. 
 
15 An ideology, theory or philosophy may, of course, also give birth to a new mentality.  However, one should be 
very careful picturing any linear process form mentality to ideology or visa versa. Researchers, philosophers and 
policy makers all take part in a complex social and cultural systems, where competences, ideas and cognitive 
structures may influence and inspire various individuals and groups in a wide variety of ways. One way of 
interpreting the development of new ideologies would be to model a feed-back loop where the ruling mentality of a 
social group or school inspires researchers to develop new theories that ultimately challenges the basis of this 
mentality, thereby changing it.  
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relationship between socio-economic research and policy making. Decisions of development and 
implementation of innovation policy programmes, funding schemes and other policy instruments 
are made in a complex environment of heterogeneous power distribution and responsibilities. This 
implies that simple models of rational policy choices and implementation does not resemble 
policy making in action. It also implies that simple models or analytical alternatives cannot 
address concrete policy issues and choices in a sufficiently rich way, relevant to the incentives 
structures, necessary trade-offs and negotiation processes of the policy makers working context. 
This also emphasises the contextual dimensions of policy vectors introduced, the concomitant 
limitations in their transferability and hence, the strong limitations learning based on simple best 
practice exercises. 
In analysing the interaction of research and analysis with innovation policy development, it is 
necessary to approach the two environments as different cognitive systems or fields of expertise, 
with different norm and incentive structures.  
Research vs. policy making 
Policy makers taking part in interviews and workshops with us have often complained that 
generally the main message of reports and other material from our and other research institutions 
are too academic or not relevant to policy and policy vector development. In short, they are not 
perceived as focussed at the right, or relevant, questions and issues  or giving sufficient depth 
to the analysis of the policy questions. Some explicitly state the view that researchers and analysts 
have simply not grasped the issues. Scientists on the other hand complain of contractors and 
policy makers grasp of the underlying questions and messages. This could mean that the scientist 
has failed to understand the needs of the other party, or that she is unable to communicate the new 
insight in an efficient way.  It could mean the recipient simply is not willing to invest sufficient 
resources into developing the required capabilities to understand the messages. Or  which is 
often more likely if our experiences count for something  it is a classic situation of not paying 
sufficient attention to the communication process, its language and presentation mix16. 
In general the formal background of policy makers are not substantially different from the ones of 
scientists and analysts. Neither are there reasons to believe there are systematic gaps in 
capabilities between the two. This implies that at least some policy decision makers should have 
competences needed to understand research results in general. If they find presentation of these 
inaccessible or even useless, one should look for other causes. 
We have indicated some possible, at least partial, explanations, such as those stemming from 
disagreeing mentalities or worldviews, or from differences in institutional incentives and norms. 
Furthermore, differences in assessment of the value or merit of the products supplied may stem 
from the fact that what for one party  the scientist  is the essential part, the meaning of life, for 
the other is one tool among many  and perhaps even not the most important one.  
These are neither complete, nor final explanations. The main message we want convey here is 
rather a call for an improved understandingof the interface between social science and policy 
analysis and the use of this in a policy making and priority setting context. 
Of course, there may also be rather prosaic reasons for the state of communication between policy 
makers and analysts. But what is clear, is that they are not the only reasons  and that any attempt 
to understand these reasons in their proper context require an understanding of other not so 
prosaic reasons. 
                                                 
16 For a rich discussion of a related interaction, see M. Hales (1999). 
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We cannot venture suggestions to improve communication, co-production and learning. It is, 
however, possible to map some of the most important aspects of learning and innovation in such 
institutions and give a presentation of how some of the policy makers themselves experience their 
situation. An accompanying paper outlines some concepts and suggestions for how we may 
approach policy learning from this angle. 
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